Who is a theorist? by Scerri, Eric
Revista Eureka sobre Enseñanza y Divulgación de las Ciencias 8 (3),  231-239, 2011     LA CIENCIA AYER Y HOY
Who is a theorist?
Eric Scerri
Departament of Chemistry and Biochemistry. Univesrity of California. Los Angeles, USA.  
scerri@chem.ucla.edu 
[Recibido en mayo de 2011, aceptado en julio de 2011]
This article carefully analyzes a recent paper by Weisberg in which it is claimed that when Mendeleev discovered  
the periodic table he was not working as a modeler but instead as a theorist. I argue that Weisberg is mistaken in  
several respects and that the periodic table should be regarded as a classification, not as a theory. In the second  
part of the article an attempt is made to elevate the status of classifications by suggesting that they provide a form 
of ‘side-ways explanation’. 
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Comments on Weisberg’s “Who is a modeler?”
In a paper published in 2007, Michael Weisberg sets out to answer the question of “who is a  
modeler?” (Weisberg, 2007).  His study presents a contrast between the work of Volterra’s 
mathematical approach to the question of why there was an unusual shortage of fish in the  
Adriatic Sea shortly after the end of the First World War and Mendeleev’s discovery of the 
periodic system in 1869. Weisberg claims that Volterra’s work is a good example of scientific  
modeling and consequently that Volterra can definitely be said to be a modeler. 
Weisberg then considers Mendeleev’s discovery of the periodic system, and the subsequent 
use that Mendeleev made of his discovery, in order to argue that this was not an example of 
scientific  modeling.  Rather than being a modeler,  Weisberg claims that “…Mendeleev is a 
theorist”, contrary to the account provided by Shapere among others (Shapere, 1977).
In my own response I will have little to say about Volterra except to agree with Weisberg’s  
assessment that this study was a good example of modeling. My critique will  focus on the 
work of Mendeleev as described by Weisberg. Moreover, my concern will not be so much 
with whether or not Mendeleev was a modeler. It so happens that I also agree with Weisberg  
in denying that Mendeleev was acting as a modeler. My disagreement is with Weisberg’s claim 
that,  rather  than  being  a  modeler,  Mendeleev  was  functioning  as  a  theorist  and  that  his  
periodic system can be regarded as a theory rather than as a model. My own suggestion is that  
Mendeleev provided a classification rather than a model or theory. Before returning to expand 
on this suggestion I would like to analyze Weisberg’s statement about Mendeleev in some 
detail.
Mendeleev’s Predictions
Weisberg writes, 
“Similarly, it has been argued that Mendeleev articulated an important classification system, but not a  
theory. For example, Shapere claimed that what Mendeleev discovered was an ordered domain and that  
‘[o]rderings of domains are themselves suggestive of several different sorts of lines of further research’ but  
not themselves theories (Shapere [1977], p. 534). I believe this view to be mistaken for several reasons.  
The first reason involves the remarkable predictions that Mendeleev was able to make on the basis of  
his Periodic System” (Weisberg, 2007, p. 213).
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Weisberg continues by citing detailed evidence to show that three of Mendeleev’s predictions, 
those of gallium, scandium and germanium were especially accurate. 
Weisberg then writes,
“Mendeleev’s predictions might look like trivial exercises, making inferences about missing ‘books on  
the shelf’ or filling empty slots. This underestimates the significance of the achievement: Mendeleev had  
no empirical knowledge that there were any empty slots to be filled” (Weisberg, 2007, p. 214).
I  want  to  begin  by  exploring  this  last  statement.  I  believe  that,  quite  to  the  contrary, 
Mendeleev’s basis for believing that there were slots remaining to be filled in the periodic table 
were  entirely based on empiricism. After accommodating the 63 known elements into a two-
dimensional grid it became glaringly obvious to Mendeleev that gaps remained to be filled.
Even if one considers just a one-dimensional ordering of the elements according to increasing 
values of atomic weights it is clear that gaps exist between zinc (65) and arsenic (75), as shown 
in figure 1, given that typical gaps between two consecutive elements involve lower atomic 
weight differences1. The necessity for such gaps becomes even clearer because of the second 
dimension  of  the  periodic  table,  which  is  chemical  similarity.  This  presents  a  further 
constraint,  namely that other elements cannot be ‘pushed’ from side to side to avoid such 
gaps. That is to say, although there is a clear gap between the atomic weight values of zinc and 
arsenic, Mendeleev was not at liberty to move arsenic and selenium to the left, since doing so 
would destroy the vertical analogy between the chemical behavior of arsenic with phosphorus 
on one hand and selenium with sulfur on the other2.
Figure 1. Mendeleev’s periodic system of 1871 accompanying the article in which he made detailed predictions  
on the properties of as yet undiscovered elements with atomic weights of 44, 68 and 72. 
I turn to the following passage from Weisberg’s paper,
1 Similarly the large gap in atomic weights between calcium (40) and titanium (48) led Mendeleev quite naturally 
to postulate the existence of an intermediate element to which he attributed the atomic weight of 44 as also seem  
in figure 1.
2 If the reader is wondering why authors before Mendeleev did not leave gaps and make predictions the answer is  
that several of them did do so contrary to the popular myth that only Mendeleev did (Scerri, 2007).  The fact  
remains  however,  that  Mendeleev  capitalized  on  gaps  and  predictions  to  a  greater  degree  than  the  other 
discoverers of the periodic system.
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“His [Mendeleev’s] task was thus not as simple as interpolating the properties of unknown elements  
on the basis of known elements. He first needed to hypothesize the existence of the missing elements by  
analyzing the theoretical structure he had created. Then he was able to use the trends posited by the  
Periodic Table to make predictions about the properties of the ‘missing’ elements. This prediction was a  
theoretical, not merely classificatory, achievement” (Weisberg, 2007, p. 214).
Unfortunately,  Weisberg  says nothing  to support  his  claim that  Mendeleev examined “the  
theoretical structure that he had created”. This claim would need to be motivated by some reference 
to Mendeleev’s own writings, although I do not think this will be possible from my knowledge 
of  the Russian chemist’s  writings.  I  must therefore disagree with Weisberg and insist  that 
Mendeleev’s  predictions  were not a  theoretical  but a  classificatory  achievement.  Nor do I 
regard the latter to be an achievement of the “merely” variety as Weisberg seems to suppose it 
would have been. I am interested in the fact that Weisberg seems to want to devalue the worth 
of classifications, an issue that I will return to in the second half of this article.
Returning to Weisberg’s words,
“While  I  believe  that  Mendeleev’s  remarkable  predictions  are  one  sign  that  he  had  developed  an  
important theoretical structure, this view is not uncontroversial” (Weisberg, 2007, p. 214).
Weisberg proceeds to a brief mention of the views of philosopher Dudley Shapere who is one 
of the few authors to have analyzed the philosophical status of the periodic system and who 
came to the conclusion that it was not of a theoretical nature but preferred to refer to it as a  
‘domain’.  It  might  be  added that  no  commentator  from philosophy,  history  or  the  hard 
sciences has to my knowledge ever concluded that the periodic table should be regarded as a 
theory.  Rather  than  being  “not  uncontroversial”,  I  regard  Weisberg’s  suggestion  as  highly 
controversial and one that has only ever been made by him. I agree with Shapere who writes  
that the fact that the periodic table led Mendeleev to make predictions does not render the 
periodic table a theory. 
Returning to Weisberg’s paper we find,
“Even if we grant Shapere’s argument that prediction alone was not enough to make Mendeleev a  
theorist,  we should  note  that Mendeleev did give  explanations  on the basis  of  his  periodic  system” 
(Weisberg, 2007, p. 214).
The first explanation, presumably of a theoretical nature, that Weisberg offers on behalf of  
Mendeleev is the following,
“One example of a trend Mendeleev explained using his system involves the oxides of the main group  
elements. For example, Mendeleev showed that the quantity of oxygen in the oxides was a periodic  
function of the element’s group (column) on the Periodic Table. Group I elements (the alkali metals)  
formed oxides with structure R2O, where R is a generic symbol of element. Group II elements (the  
alkaline earth metals) formed oxides as R2O2 and so on up to the halogens (R2O7) (Gordin [2004],  
p. 31). This can be accounted for by the Periodic Law, but would have remained mysterious otherwise” 
(Weisberg, 2007, p. 214-215).
However, one can still argue that the formulas of these oxides remain mysterious even after  
they have been subsumed into the periodic law. There is nothing explanatory in the periodic 
law, which is a statement that the properties of the elements are a periodic function of their 
atomic weights3.
3 Mendeleev wrongly believed that it was something about the property of weight that explained the periodic  
table.  Mendeleev’s periodic law was therefore not explanatory, even if modern accounts of the periodic law in  
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As I see it, this appeal to the formulas of oxides of the elements represents a rather circular 
argument and not the kind of deductive argument that Weisberg should be providing in order 
to ground his claim that Mendeleev gave theoretical predictions concerning the elements. I am 
trying to point out that if anything Mendeleev was led to constructing the periodic system 
because of the pattern of formulas for the highest oxides of the elements. Nowhere, however, 
is Mendeleev providing a deeper explanation for the occurrence of these formulas. All that 
one might say is that the periodic system is consistent with these patterns of oxide formulas, and 
not surprisingly since this kind of information was used to arrive at the periodic system. For 
an explanation to count as being theoretical it should be couched at a deeper or more abstract 
level. If the explanation is nothing but the periodic table which was partly devised to account 
for the data in question, I fail to see how it may be providing a theoretical account of that very  
data. 
If  the  explanation  is  provided  by  the  periodic  law,  something  that  Weisberg  mentions  in 
passing, this is already more convincing since there is a sense at least of a deduction from a 
more abstract level (Gordin, 2004). In appealing to Gordin, Michael Weisberg seems to be 
equating scientific laws with theories. How else would the explanatory role of the periodic law, 
if indeed it had one, count in favor of the role of the periodic system qua theory? 
But  it  should  be  noted  that  Gordin’s  detailed  historical  study  of  Mendeleev’s  work  is 
concerned  with  how the  periodic  system gradually  changed from a  classification  into  the 
periodic law, at least as it was regarded by Mendeleev himself. It should also be realized that  
for all  its historical  value the question of whether Mendeleev believed that his system had 
become a law is  of  somewhat secondary  value as  Gordin duly  notes.  The more pressing 
question should be whether in fact it can be justly regarded as a scientific law and whether it 
provided any explanatory value over and above a phenomenological law that summarizes the 
observed regularities among the elements. But the true explanation for the occurrence of the 
various formulas, if anything, lies in the concept of valence of elements, not at the level of the  
periodic table, or indeed the periodic law, that summarizes the facts about formulas.
The putative theoretical explanation of the formulas of oxides of elements, that has just been 
discussed, would seem to be Weisberg’s second of his claimed “many reasons” for believing 
that the periodic table should be regarded as a theory. I now move on to what appears to be 
his  third  reason  in  the  course  of  which  Weisberg  already  weakens  his  own  position 
considerably,
“Although accounting for this trend did not give Mendeleev causal or mechanistic knowledge about the  
formation of oxides, it certainly allowed him to make contrastive explanations about the reactivity of  
different metals. It also brought a number of things previously accepted as brute facts in to systematic  
unity. By the lights of many philosophers of science, these achievements count as explanatory ones and  
hence by Shapere’s own standard, Mendeleev’s system is a theory” (Weisberg, 2007, p. 215).
It would have been helpful if Weisberg had cited one or two examples of Mendeleev’s giving 
“contrastive explanations” so that the reader might have had the opportunity to weigh up this 
further argument in favor of the periodic table being regarded as theoretically explanatory. 
Secondly,  the  fact  that  the  periodic  table  brought  about  a  great  deal  of  unity,  Weisberg’s 
fourth reason, is quite undeniable but this does not necessarily imply that the periodic table  
was functioning as a theory.  A system of classification,  which the periodic table is usually 
regarded as being, is also quite capable of bringing about unification.
The  final  sentence  in  the  above  quotation  is  rather  mysterious  because  even  if  other 
philosophers may regard the giving of contrastive explanations and unification to a body of 
terms of quantum physics do offer a causal explanation for the periodicity in elemental properties.
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knowledge as a mark of theoretical explanation, the simple fact is that Shapere is not among 
them, as  he carefully  points  out in  the course of  his  denial  of  a  theoretical  status to the  
periodic  table  (Shapere,  1977).  Providing  explanations  and unification  are  not  the  criteria 
which Shapere believes constitute a theory.
Let me move to the fifth and final reason why Weisberg seems to believe that the periodic 
table should be regarded as a theory and Mendeleev as a theorist. 
“As Shapere further argued, Mendeleev’s discovery of periodicity gives us a new fact that requires a  
further theoretical explanation. Periodicity is a phenomenon which is still not completely derivable from  
quantum mechanics (Scerri [2004]), although using semi-empirical methods, the trend can be derived  
(Levine [1991]). This is another reason that some, including Shapere, have questioned whether the  
periodic  system  is  a  theory  or  that  Mendeleev  made  a  theoretical,  as  opposed  to  a  classificatory,  
contribution to chemistry” (Weisberg, 2007, p. 215). 
I think we should beware of conflating two distinct ideas, namely explanation of the periodic  
table and explanation from quantum mechanics. Moreover, Shapere’s highly nuanced account 
seems to be treated far too briefly by in the above quotation. Weisberg seems to be willing to 
connect Shapere’s account to the more recently discussed failure to fully reduce the periodic  
system by means of quantum mechanics that some authors have analyzed in the literature 
(Scerri,  2007).  But  Shapere’s  concern,  as  correctly  reported in the first  line  of  Weisberg’s 
passage, is  just that the periodic table,  when first discovered,  was in need of a theoretical  
explanation.  Shapere  continues  by  analyzing  what  kind  of  theoretical  explanation  was 
suggested and concludes that it was an atomistic explanation that was gradually taking shape in 
related fields such as statistical thermodynamics and spectroscopy. Nowhere does Shapere go 
on  to  discuss  the  eventual  quantum mechanical  explanation  for  the  periodic  system and 
certainly not the degree to which this explanation is successful or not. 
So when Weisberg says in the last line of the previous quotation that the still current failure to 
fully  explain the periodic  system from quantum mechanics is  another  reason for Shapers’ 
doubting the theoretical status of the periodic system he is erring for two reasons. First of all,  
Shapere did not comment on whether the periodic system had actually been explained from 
physics. Secondly Weisberg’s analysis sets up a straw man position which does not necessitate  
the criticism that he proceeds to give when writing, 
“While it is true that Mendeleev’s periodic system is in need of further theoretical explanation, the same  
could  be  said  of  any  theory  that  is  not  a  fundamental  physical  one.  Everyone  accepts  classical  
thermodynamics as a theory,  yet  many would argue that core  parts  of  it  such as the Second Law  
themselves cry out for deeper theoretical explanation. Theories allow us to unify, make predictions, and  
frame  explanations.  It  should  not  be  required  that  they  need  no  further  explanation  themselves”  
(Weisberg, 2007, p. 215). 
Shapere is not asking whether the periodic system, qua theory,  is  fully  explained by yet a  
deeper theory for the simple reason that he does not believe it to be a theory in the first place.  
Furthermore, it might even be said that if the periodic system did in fact have the nature of a 
theory it would have rendered its explanation by quantum mechanics a good deal easier. But if 
the periodic table’s is regarded as a classification, this helps to explain why it is not even in a 
suitable form for reduction by a deeper theory. Indeed this may be one of the reasons why the 
reduction of the periodic system is problematic whereas the reduction of legitimate theories to 
deeper theories tend to be a more straightforward endeavor. 
Weisberg concludes his section on the periodic table by saying, 
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“Mendeleev’s  system clearly  unifies,  allows  us  to  make predictions,  and can serve  as the  basis  for  
chemical explanations. Thus it ought to be considered a theory, and Mendeleev considered a theorist” 
(Weisberg, 2007, p. 215).
While I agree that Mendeleev’s system unifies, classifies and allows us to make predictions,  
this is not sufficient to conclude that it should be considered as a theory. What is lacking is the 
fourth quality that Weisberg is attributing to the periodic system, namely the ability to serve as 
the basis for chemical explanations. If it does give any form of explanation it is not of the  
deductive  theoretical  kind  that  Weisberg  is  alluding  to  but  more  in  the  form  of  a 
bootstrapping  explanation  which  shows  consistency with  the  chemical  facts.  As  I  conceded 
earlier, I accept that the periodic law does provide some form of deductive explanation but I 
claim not a very successful one. As I also stressed earlier, in many cases it was the chemical 
facts  that  led  to  the  discovery  of  the  periodic  system  rather  than  the  periodic  system 
explaining the chemical facts. 
It  would appear that  for Weisberg there exist  just  two main options,  namely models  and 
theories. He wishes to deny that the periodic system is a model and so is compelled to argue 
that it must be a theory. In doing so Weisberg shows an unusual reductionist bent, given that 
the overwhelming tendency in the philosophical study of models in recent decades has been a 
move towards claiming that models, rather theories alone, explain scientific phenomena. What 
Weisberg seems to miss is the possibility that the periodic system, qua classification system, is 
also capable of a form of explanation, albeit a different form of explanation than one obtains 
from theories. It is to this issue that I would like to turn in the second part of this article.
Do  classifications  provide  explanations  and  if  so  what  kind  of 
explanations? 
Classification is a basic human activity which we all perform hundreds of times a day. We sort 
objects  into  appropriate  piles,  and  we  even  arrange  our  thoughts  before  an  important 
encounter. We classify new people we meet after a few instants in order to cope better with 
any ensuing interactions. If I meet a child of five years old I draw on my store of knowledge  
and classify the child with other five year olds I may have encountered because this act of  
classification allows me to act accordingly.
This kind of activity is not usually regarded as providing any form of explanation but I want to 
propose that in many ways it may represent explanation, albeit of the non-deductive kind. It is  
a form of explanation that functions by accommodating new data among the already known 
store of data that we possess.
It is a form of explanation which provides insight by establishing consistency with previously 
encountered information. It can be called a form of bootstrapping explanation. 
Classification is highly devalued in the sciences. Rutherford famously declared that the only  
true science was physics while all the rest were just forms of stamp collecting. Authors like 
Weisberg who acknowledge the predictive power of the periodic classification are apparently 
obliged to try to elevate the periodic system into a form of theory because they believe that  
the only forms of valid explanation are bottom-up deductive explanations which appeal to 
theories. But these days there is a move in the philosophy of science towards claiming that it  
may be models rather than theories  that are the agents  of  explanation (Cartwright,  1999). 
However, this kind of license has never been extended to classifications as far as I am aware.
Mendeleev himself tried to justify the predictions and accommodations he made concerning 
various elements by declaring that he had discovered a periodic law. But his discovery was not 
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strictly a law since the periodicity in the property of the elements is not exact and there are 
numerous  exceptions.  In  addition  his  newly  claimed  law  did  not  provide  any  form  of 
explanation since it was merely a statement of the fact that chemical behavior recurs after  
regular intervals.
Another blemish in Mendeleev’s periodic law, although not discovered until later, was that the 
period length before repetition occurs is not constant, although this feature can be explained 
by recourse to quantum mechanics. Last but not least, Mendeleev’s periodic law was actually  
incorrect because chemical periodicity is a periodic function of atomic number rather than 
atomic weight. For example, Mendeleev’s insistence on using atomic weight led him to predict 
that iodine had to have a higher atomic weight than tellurium, which it does not (Scerri, 2007).
Classification as sideways explanation
I  want  to  now  return  to  Weisberg’s  statement,  quoted  above,  concerning  the  oxides  of 
elements and their formulas and my saying that I believed that there was a grain of truth in 
Weisberg’s analysis. While I denied that the periodic system could be regarded as providing a  
deductive explanation, which would have allowed us to bestow the honorific label of ‘theory’  
to  it,  I  have  claimed  that  there  is  nonetheless  a  form  of  bootstrapping  explanation  or 
explanation  by  virtue  of  displaying  overall  consistency  with  the  facts.  It  is  this  form  of 
explanation that I will term sideways explanation to distinguish it from bottom-up explanation 
that theories provide. Classifications to the extent that they explain at all, do so in a sideways 
fashion but not in a deductive fashion. I believe that it is this intuition that is guiding Weisberg  
but that he lapses into saying that such consistency relationships represent a form of bottom-
up explanation from a theory.
As  Shapere  and  others  have  pointed  out,  the  periodic  system  has  been  described  as  a 
classification,  a  model  and an ordered domain but  very  seldom as  a  theory  either  by  the 
discoverers of the periodic system or by later commentators.
In a later article I will explore the notion of sideways explanation as distinct from bottom-up 
(deductive)  or top-down type explanations.  The uni-directionality  of explanations,  whether 
bottom-up  as  traditionally  conceived  or  top-down  as  discussed  by  some  emergentists,  is  
seldom questioned (McLaughlin, 1992). Here I am proposing a widening in the way that we 
regard explanation4. I propose that explanations may occur in a multi-directional sense and 
that joint explanations may frequently be operating at once. 
Finally, I propose to represent the comparison of sideways explanation on one hand with the 
conventional view of explanation on the other, by considering an analogy with plane polarized 
light (see figure 2). Plane-polarized light relative to non-polarized light is like conventional or 
unidirectional explanation is to multi-directional explanation. In order to obtain a richer, and 
more general, understanding of explanation we need to widen our view of these topics. We 
need to, as it were, remove the polarizing film and need to revert to a multi-directional non-
polarized view of these issues.
Just as accommodation is traditionally devalued in the assessment of scientific discoveries, so 
is  sideways  explanation.  This  is  not  so  surprising  as  sideways  explanation  is  a  form  of 
accommodation of  data.  I  propose that  the  properties  of  an element  can be regarded as 
explained in a sideways fashion if its properties are accommodated by the constraints that exist 
4  Many other  authors  have  proposed  similar  schemes  in  which causation  is  not  necessarily  directed either 
upwards or downwards.  See for example the work of Denis Noble as summarized in his recent book, The Music 
of Life.
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from surrounding elements on each side as they appear on a periodic table5. It is suggested 
that removing the ‘filter’ which biases out all but vertical explanations might provide a richer 
understanding of scientific explanation. Such a general proposal for explanation of a lateral 
form is  not  altogether  original  and has  been discussed by systems biologists  in  particular 
(Noble, 2006).
Figure 2. Proposed analogy. Non-polarized light (on left) is analogous to multi-directional explanation while  
plane-polarized  light  (after  passage  through  first  polarizer)  is  analogous  to  uni-directional  or  conventional 
explanation.
Return to elements
What causes germanium to have a valence of 4? According to a bottom-up explanation, it is 
due to atoms of germanium having four outer-shell electrons which can be shared. Of course 
what Mendeleev termed his periodic law could not explain this fact since electrons had not yet 
been discovered.
In addition to this explanation is the fact that germanium lies between gallium and arsenic 
which have valences of 3 and 5 respectively which causes it to have a valence of 4 since this  
valence represents  a  stepping stone from that  of  gallium to that  of  arsenic.  Similarly,  the 
properties of germanium can be predicted from those of the two adjacent elements, gallium 
and arsenic, since its properties are constrained by these flanking elements. When Mendeleev 
predicted the properties of gallium he was using the periodic system which in the sense I am 
suggesting provides a sideways explanation for the properties of this element.
It is possible that this new view of classification providing explanation in a side-ways fashion  
can cast  new light  on the much debated question of  the relative  value  of  prediction  and 
accommodation by scientific  developments.  The form of  side-ways explanation  that  I  am 
proposing is closely related to accommodation by scientific theories or scientific developments 
in general6. The fact that bottom-up explanation has been universally favored over sideways 
explanation, is similar to the notion that prediction from a theory should be favored over 
accommodation. It is due perhaps to the lingering influence of the logical positivist approach 
to philosophy of science and the belief that explanations must be of the reductive or top-
down variety in which everything is ultimately deducible from physical theory. 
5 Of course the constraints can be provided from the elements above and below in a group of the periodic table 
or even elements placed diagonally.  This will still be regarded as sideways explanation although it may not be 
literally sideways on a two-dimensional periodic table.
6 Recall that the periodic table which has been the subject of a good part of the recent debate is not a theory, at  
least for the vast majority of authors.
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